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This paper contains the formulation 
and analysis of a model to measure, com- 
pare, and contrast the effects of counter- 
force (pre-launch attack) and active 
defense (post-launch attack) against tacti- 
cal ballistic missiles (TBM's). It is shown 
that without counterforce an active defense 
system could require an impractical num- 
ber of weapons to counter incoming mis- 
siles and/or their warheads. This number 
is shown to decrease geometrically as effec- 
tive counterforce is used, so that the 
expected number of warheads killed 
increases dramatically with counterforce 
that is only modestly effective. Actual 
distributions of warheads reaching the tar- 
get area are shown to be complex mixtures 
of binomial distributions. It is shown that 
normal approximations to these distribu- 
tions based on the easily-calculated means 
and variances often agree poorly with the 
actual distributions. This is especially true 
when using effective counterforce. 
INTRODUCTION 
In an earlier paper, (reference [1]) 
Conner, Ehlers and Marshall discuss the 
similarities between theater ballistic mis- 
sile (TBM) defense and anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW). Both missions require 
searching, detecting, localizing, classifying, 
and finally attacking the object of interest. 
A great deal has been learned over the past 
fifty years on how to accomplish a success- 
ful ASW mission, and many of the lessons 
learned are pertinent to combating TBM's. 
Notice that ASW was never referred to as 
torpedo defense. Attempts were not made 
to kill the torpedo in the water; efforts were 
always concentrated on going after the 
launcher (the submarine) or the infrastruc- 
ture necessary for it to operate. The reader 
interested in the ASW/TBM comparison is 
referred to that earlier paper. The purpose 
of this paper is to present and analyze a 
mathematical model of TBM launcher and 
missile flight operations so that compar- 
isons can be made of the effectiveness of 
various strategies to counter the threat. The 
model presented here extends the earlier 
analysis and results found in reference [1]. 
Figure 1 shows a schematic of the oper- 
ations of a TBM launcher and the missile 
assumed in this report. Launchers are 
expected to be stored in some fixed storage 
area. When hostilities are about to com- 
mence the launchers will move to a for- 
ward area for assembly, fueling and mat- 
ing with the missiles. From there a launch- 
er will move to its launch area, and after 
launch will return to the forward area to 
prepare for the next launch. We assume 
that each launcher has the potential to 
launch m missiles, after which it must be 
taken out of service for an extended time. 
The reason could be that it must undergo 
extensive repair and refit, or it could run 
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Figure 1: Schematic of Theater Ballistic Missile Operations 
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missile has n (>1) warheads. 
In this paper we assume that there are five 
phases in the TBM operation when the missile 
system could be attacked. These are 
(a) Counterforce 
1. Attack of the launcher with mated 
missile before launch between assem- 
bly area and launch site.' 
2. Attack of the launcher after missile 
launch either at the launch site or on 
return to assembly area. 
(b) Active Defense 
3. Attack of the missile during the boost 
phase, 
4. Attack the missile on reentry before 
multiple warheads separate, 
5. Attack each warhead in the terminal 
phase. 
The effectiveness of attacking the system in 
each of these five phases is assumed to be sum- 
marized by a kill probability p;- for the f-th 
phase, or equivalently by a survival probability 
qp where q^ = \- /?,-. Although it is more usual to 
formulate a model in terms of kill probabilities, 
survival probabilities are used in Section 2 
because of the simplification that results in 
model development and presentation of results. 
Our objectives are to find the probability distri- 
bution, mean, and variance of the number of 
warheads reaching the target area from each 
launcher, and the expected number of weapons 
required in each phase, in terms of the maxi- 
mum number of missiles per launcher (m), the 
number of warheads per missile (n) and the five 
survival probabilities for the five phases as 
shown in Figure 1. Using expressions for these 
quantities, in Section 3 we compare the effect of 
changing the model parameters to demonstrate 
that counterforce, with effectiveness measured 
by c\i and c\i> wul almost surely be a necessary 
part of a layered defense system; without at 
least a modest success rate in prosecuting the 
launchers, effective active defense may not be 
feasible. 
1. THE ANTI-TBM MODEL 
We build the mathematical model in stages 
following the missile's path from being mount- 
ed on the launcher to its or its launcher's 
destruction, or the arrival of its warheads in the 
target area. First we develop the probability dis- 
tribution, mean and variance of the number of 
missiles that are successfully launched from a 
given launcher. These clearly will depend on the 
counterforce effort against the launcher. Next 
we derive the probability distribution, mean 
and variance of the number of missiles that sur- 
vive the boost and reentry phases. Finally we 
find expressions for the probability distribution, 
mean and variance of the number of warheads 
that survive the final phase. The distribution of 
the warheads surviving to reach the target area 
is a complex mixture of Binomial probabilities. 
The section ends with numerical examples to 
illustrate the results. A detailed analysis using 
the model is presented in Section 2. 
• Launcher Movement Phases 
Let X be the number of missiles launched 
from a given launcher before it is either 
destroyed or has launched m missiles. We 
assume independent attacks each time the 
launcher attempts an outward journey to the 
launch site, and similarly for each time it 
attempts a return journey to reload. Thus X is a 
random variable that can take on any integer 
value from 0 (the launcher is destroyed on the 
first outward journey) to m (all attempts to 
destroy the launcher fail). Note that X > i if and 
only if the launcher survives the first outward 
journey, and then survives i succeeding cycles 
back to the reload point and out again to the 
launch site. Thus 
Pr{X > 0) 
Pr{X>l} 







The expected value of X is found by summing 
this cumulative tail distribution, 
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rn-l «ft 1-(<M2)' 
E[X]=X?l(Wfe) 
f=0 (l-te)) 0) 
This equation holds if both 0 < CJJ < 1 and 
0 < cj2 < 1/ and is equal to m when both q^ and (72 
are equal to 1 (zero effect in killing the launcher 
before or after launch). 
To find its variance we need to find its sec- 
ond moment. For a non-negative integer-valued 
random variable, say N, it is easy to show that 
N" = 2JTiPr{N>i'} + E[N] 
i=l 
so 




This holds when both 0 < <71 < 1 and 0 < q2 < 1> 
When both q^ and (72 are equal to 1, E[X2] = m2. 
We find the variance of X in the usual way by 
subtracting the square of Equation (1) from 
Equation (2). 
We now turn to finding the expected num- 
ber of weapons required in the first two phases. 
Before attempting to do this it is necessary to 
make two important assumptions that are 
assumed to hold in all five phases. First, we 
assume that every time there is an opportunity 
to attack the launcher, the missile, or one of its 
warheads, this opportunity is taken and prose- 
cuted with a single weapon. It may be that in 
practice more than one weapon is used, so that 
the numbers determined by the model in this 
report can be thought of as lower bounds. 
Second, the extreme case of some kill probabili- 
ty being zero in a given phase can be obtained 
in one of two ways, either (i) by not attempting 
an attack during that phase, or (ii) by attacking 
with a completely ineffective weapon system. 
In this paper we assume that the first of these is 
true; any time we use a p,- of zero (qj of one) in 
phase i we assume no weapons are expended in 
phase i. The expected numbers of weapons 
required should not be interpreted as estimates 
of weapons requirements in actual operations. 
In this paper they are intended as an aid in gain- 
ing insight when comparing the effectiveness of 
changing kill probabilities in the various phas- 
es. 
Let WgL and W^L be the numbers of 
weapons used in the "before launch" and "after 
launch" phases respectively against the launch- 
er. Notice that if no missiles are launched, W^L 
is zero (the launcher was destroyed on its first 
outward journey). It is easy to show that no 
matter how many missiles are launched from a 
given launcher, WAL = X and its first two 
moments are given by Equations (1) and (2). 
By following the cycle of the launcher one 
can see that the cumulative tail distribution of 
WgL is given by 
Pr{Wi BL >? = (qiq2)[   ifi = 0,1,2, ..., (m-1), 
= 0 if i > m. 
(2)        Thus, 
£[%] = \-q\q-l 
and by comparing this with Equation (1) we see 
that 
E[WBl] = E[X]/qv (3) 
As our analysis progresses through the 
boost and reentry phases, expressions are found 
that require the probability mass function (pmf) 
of X. From the cumulative tail distribution 
above this is seen to be 
PX(0) = 1-<71, 
i-\ px(i) = cii{'[-cim){cim)   . 
Px(m)=qi{q\q2 
i = l,2,...,m-l, 
m-1 
(4) 
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• The Boost and Reentry Phases 
The boost phase and reentry phase survival 
probabilities are q3 and (74 respectively (see 
Figure 1). Let the number of missiles surviving 
both of these phases (per launcher) be Y. Clearly 
this is also a random variable, and if we assume 
that the attempt to shoot down a given missile 
in either phase is independent of the outcomes 
of earlier or later attempts at other missiles, the 
conditional random variable [YIX] has a 
Binomial distribution with parameters X and 
c/3<74. Thus E[YIX] = Xq3qA and Var[Y\X] = 
Xc/3<74 (1 - (73(74). By unconditioning on X, the 
expected number of warheads surviving the 
reentry phase is 
E[Y] = ^4 E[X] (5) 
where E[X] is given by Equation (1). The vari- 
ance of Y is found using the standard condi- 
tional variance argument, 
Var[Y] = Ex[Var[Y IX]] + Varx[E[Y IX]], 
so 
Var[Y] = 
(73(74 (1 - (73(74)E[X] + (q3q4)2Var[X],       (6) 
where Equations (1) and (2) are used to find 
Var[X]. 
To find the pmf of Y, note that 
PYIx(;IO = fr(/;f,<73(74) 
where 0 < / < i, 0 < (73(74 < 1, and b(j; i, p) = 
%i{\-vp. 
> J Unconditioning on X we find 
m 
VY(/) = Xb(i;i'^4)Px{^i = 0A,2,...,m,   (7) 
where the Px®'s are giyen in Equation (4). 
Let WB and WR be the number of weapons 
used in the boost and reentry phases respective- 
ly against the missiles from a given launcher, 
and assume that exactly one weapon is used 
against each in each phase. If X survive launch, 
Wg = X and WR is a Binomial random variable 
with parameters X and (73. Thus E[Wg] = E[X], 
and E[WR] = q3E[X). 
• The Final Phase 
In the final phase the probability that a 
given warhead survives an attack is (75. Again 
we assume independence among all attempts to 
destroy incoming warheads. Let the number of 
warheads surviving the final phase from the 
z'-th incoming missile be Zr-, i = 1, 2, ..., Y. Each 
Z; is a Binomial random variable with parame- 
ters n and q5, so E[Zj] = nq5 and Var[Z-\ = 
nq$(l - (75). Let the number of warheads surviv- 
ing the final phase (per launcher) be H, so 
Y 
Conditioning on Y, E[H I Y] = nYq5 and 
Var[H I Y] = YVar[Z{] = nYq5(l - q5). Uncondi- 
tioning, 
E[H] = nq5E[Y] (8) 
and 
Var[H] = nq5(l - q5)E[Y) + n2q52Var[Y],   (9) 
where E[Y] and Var[Y] are given by Equations 
(5) and (6) respectively. 
The pmf of H, p^Oc), is found in a similar 
way by first conditioning on Y. If Y = 0 (no mis- 
siles survive through the reentry phase) no war- 
heads can reach the target area, so 
VHI y(010) = 1. If Y = ;' > 0, H is the sum of; iden- 
tically distributed binomials so that p^ | y(^ I ;') 
= b(k; nj, (75). Unconditioning, 
m 
PH(k) = ^b(k;nJ'%)PY{i\k = 0,l,2,...,mn (10) 
where the Py0)'s are given in Equation (7). 
Let Wp be the number of weapons used in 
the final phase. If Y missiles survive the reentry 
phase and each carries n warheads, then 
Wp = nY. Thus the results on Y can be used to 
calculate the measures of interest on Wp. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the model by show- 
ing the cumulative tail distribution of H for 
three different sets of survival probabilities. For 
all three cases the number of missiles per 
launcher (m) is 20, and the number of warheads 
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Figure 2: Cumulative Tail Distributions of Warheads Reaching Target Area 
per missile (n) is 10. The rightmost curve is 
obtained using no (or completely ineffective) 
counter force {q-y = qi = 1), boost and reentry 
survival probabilities (q% and q£) of 0.7, and a 
final phase warhead survival probability (q5) of 
0.4. The center curve is obtained by decreasing 
<73 and q^ from 0.7 to 0.6, and q5 from 0.4 to 0.3. 
The leftmost curve is obtained using the origi- 
nal set of parameters but decreasing both q-y and 
<?2 from 1 to 0.9. Clearly a modest increase in kill 
probability in counterforce operations from 0 to 
0.1 has a dramatic effect on the number of war- 
heads reaching the target area. An increase in 
kill probability from 0 to 0.1 in the two phases 
of the launcher shows a drop in the 10-th per- 
centile from 52 warheads to 23, compared to a 
drop from 53 to 31 for a similar increase in kill 
probability in the boost, reentry and final phas- 
es. Another way to interpret the three curves is 
to note that the chance of at most 20 warheads 
(10% of a potential of 200) reaching the target 
area is 3% for the base case. With a given 
improvement in active defense this increases to 
46%, but if that improvement were made in 
counterforce instead of active defense it would 
increase to 87%. These numbers are shown in 
Column 2 of Table 1. Columns 3 through 6 
show the expected number of weapons used in 
each phase. A small improvement in counter- 
force effectiveness sharply decreases the expect- 
ed number of weapons required for active 
defense. Note that the zero entries in columns 3 
and 4 result from the assumption that when q-y = 
qi = 1, it is assumed that no counterforce is 
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Case Pr{H<20( E{WBL] E[WAL] E[WB] E[WR] E[WF] 
<?1 = m = !/ <?3 = <?4 = O-7/ <75 = 0.4 0.03 0 0 20 14 98 
qi=q2 = 1,93 = 94 = 0.6,95 = 0.3 0.46 0 0 20 12 72 
91 = <72 = 0.9,93 = 94 = 0.7,95 = 0.4 0.87 5.2 4.7 4.7 3.3 23 
Table 1: Sample Output for Numerical Example 
attempted. 
The next section contains a more detailed 
analysis of the model as parameter values are 
varied. 
2. MODEL ANALYSIS 
Throughout this section results are demon- 
strated using kill probabilities /?j through p5 
rather than survival probabilities, where pi = 
1 - 9J\ We refer to a kill probability vector which 
is defined to be {p\, p2, P3> VA> V5>- For example 
(0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.6) represents no chance of 
killing the launcher in its outward journey to 
the launch site, a 20% chance of kill on its return 
journey to reload, a 30% chance of killing the 
missile in its boost phase, a 50% chance in its 
reentry phase, and a 60% chance of killing each 
warhead in the final phase. 
Theater anti-missile defense today consists 
primarily of the use of the PATRIOT system in 
the final phase. The navy Aegis ship anti-mis- 
sile defense system is currently being consid- 
ered for modification for the reentry phase of 
the anti-TBM mission, and the army is develop- 
ing the THAAD (theater high altitude air 
defense) system for this same phase. The air 
force is currently developing boost phase sys- 
tems. Although some work has been done on 
detecting and destroying launchers prior to or 
after a launch, operational experience in Desert 
Storm showed that current systems and opera- 
tional doctrine are ineffective. This current state 
can be modeled by setting py p2, P3 and p^ all 
equal to 0. We can set p$ at some value depend- 
ing on how well one believes the PATRIOT 
works. As a base case by which to measure pos- 
sible system improvement we set p5 to 0.7. Thus 
Base Case Kill Probability Vector 
= (0,0,0,0,0.7). (11) 
Also as a base case we assume that a launcher 
can launch at most 20 missiles before requiring 
major overhaul, or before it runs out of missiles, 
so m = 20. 
We look at three measures of effectiveness 
for the (random) number of warheads arriving 
in the target area, H. These are (i) the mean 
E[H], (ii) the median, or that value h such that 
Pr{H < h\ = 0.5, and (iii) the ninetieth percentile, 
or that value h such that Pr{H < h] = 0.90. We 
also look at the expected number of active 
defense weapons required (E[W^l, E[W^], and 
E[Wp]), and the expected number of counter- 
force weapons (E[WQ\). We first look at today's 
case where there is only one warhead per mis- 
sile (n = 1), and show how some performance 
measures are affected by improving kill proba- 
bilities in each of the first four phases. This is 
followed by a similar analysis when multiple 
warheads are considered. 
• Single Warhead Analysis 
The mean numbers of warheads (and hence 
missiles since we are assuming one warhead 
per missile) that arrive in the target area shown 
plotted in Figure 3 as a function of the kill prob- 
ability at a particular stage. The figure contains 
three curves. All three start at the same point 
(0,6) because the expected number of warheads 
reaching the target area, E[H], is 6 when m = 20, 
n = 1, the base case probabilities are given in 
(11), and Equations (1), (5), and (8) are used. We 
investigate the effect on E[H] of increasing each 
of the four zero kill probabilities in (11) one at a 
time. 
The upper curve is found by increasing the 
kill probability of either the boost (p3) or reentry 
(^4) phase from its base value of 0 up to 0.8. In 
either case it decreases linearly with a slope of 
-6. The middle and lower curves are obtained 
by increasing p2 and P\ respectively over the 
same range. The difference in the effect of a 
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Figure 3: Mean Number of Warheads Reaching Target 
0.00 
0        0.1      0.2      0.3      0.4      0.5      0.6      0.7      Oi 
Kill Probability 
Figure 4: Median Number of Warheads Reaching Target 
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small increase in kill probability in the counter- 
force phases when compared to the active 
defense stages is dramatic; an increase from 0 to 
0.1 in either the boost or reentry phases reduces 
E[H\ from 6 to 5.4, whereas this same increase in 
either of the counterforce stages reduces it from 
6 to approximately 2.5. This significant 
improvement is caused by the fact that once a 
launcher (and its crew) is destroyed it can no 
longer fire missiles, causing a geometric reduc- 
tion in E[H]. In the active defense stages a kill 
results in the destruction of only one missile. 
The small improvement in increasing p-j rather 
than P2 *s caused by the fact that keeping p-j at 
zero means the first missile from a launcher will 
be launched for certain, whereas increasing pi 
gives a chance to destroy the launcher before its 
first missile flies. 
Figure 4 contains a similar analysis using 
the median number of warheads reaching the 
target area rather than the mean. Similar results 
are found. For the base case the median of H is 
5.4. Increasing the boost or reentry kill proba- 
bilities from 0 to 0.1 reduces this to 4.8, whereas 
this increase in pj or p2 reduces it to 1.3 and 1.6 
respectively. In other words, using a kill proba- 
bility vector (0.1, 0, 0, 0, 0.7) there is a fifty per- 
cent chance that fewer than 1.3 warheads will 
reach the target area, whereas using (0, 0, 0, 0.1, 
0.7) or (0, 0, 0.1, 0, 0.7) this number is 4.8. 
Figure 5 contains a similar analysis using 
the ninetieth percentile of the number of war- 
heads reaching the target. For the base case 
there is a ninety percent chance that the number 
of warheads reaching the target area from a 
given launcher is no more than 8.2. Increasing 
the boost or reentry kill probabilities from 0 to 
0.1 reduces this to 7.6 whereas an increase from 
0 to 0.1 in pi or p2 reduces it to 5.5 or 5.7 respec- 
tively. Although by using this measure of effec- 
tiveness there is less of a difference between 
improving counterforce and active defense, the 
difference is still significant. 
We now turn to measuring the effects of 
changing kill probabilities on the expected 
numbers of weapons used in each phase. 
Starting from the base case we assume that a 
zero kill probability in a given phase indicates 
that no attempt is being made to kill the launch- 
er or missile in that phase. Table 2 demonstrates 
typical results that can be obtained from the 
model. For the base case the expected number 
0        0.1      0.2      0.3      0.4      0.5      0.6      0.7      Oi 
Kill Probability 
Figure 5: Ninetieth Percentile of the Number of Warheads Reaching Target 
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(0, 0, 0, 0, 0.7)-Base Case 0 0 0 0 20 0.70 
(0, 0, 0, 0.2, 0.7) 0 0 0 20 16 0.42 
(0, 0, 0.2, 0, 0.7) 0 0 20 0 16 0.42 
(0, 0.2, 0, 0, 0.7) 0 4.94 0 0 4.94 1.88 
(0.2, 0, 0, 0, 0.7) 4.94 0 0 0 3.95 2.11 
Table 2: Effect of Increasing Kill Probabilities on Weapons Numbers and Effectiveness 
of weapons used per launcher when no attempt 
is made to destroy the missile before the final 
phase, and assuming one weapon for each war- 
head, is equal to the number of missiles times 
warheads per missile that a launcher can 
launch. In this example that is 20. Also for the 
base case the expected number of warhead kills 
per weapon is equal to the final phase kill prob- 
ability as should be expected. The remaining 
rows in Table 2 show the effect of increase the 
kill probability of each phase in turn from 0 to 
0.2. Note the dramatic drop in the requirement 
for weapons in the final phase by having a 
modest effectiveness in counterforce versus the 
same effectiveness in the boost or reentry phas- 
es. In those phases a modest kill probability sig- 
nificantly increases the warhead kills/weapons 
used ratio. 
Multiple Warhead Analysis 
We repeat the analysis of the last section 
using the same base case kill probability vector 
shown in (11) and twenty missiles per launcher 
(m = 20), but in this section we assume each mis- 
sile carries ten warheads (n = 10). The same 
0.3       0.4       0.5 
Kill Probability 
Figure 6: Mean Number of Warheads Reaching Target, Ten Warheads per Missile 
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0 0.1       0.2       0.3       0.4       0.5       0.6       0.7       O.i 
Kill Probability 
Figure 7: Median Number of Warheads Reaching Target, Ten Warheads per Missile 
0.1       0.2 0.3       0.4       0.5 
Kill Probability 
0.6       0.7       O.f 
Figure 8: Ninetieth Percentile of Warheads Reaching Target, Ten Warheads per Missile 
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types of results are illustrated in Figures 6, 7 
and 8 as were seen in Figures 3, 4 and 5. In fact 
since the mean is linear in n the curves in Figure 
5 are the same as those in Figure 3 except the 
vertical scale has changed by a factor of 10. 
There is no simple relationship between the 
median or the ninetieth percentile and n, 
although over some of the range of the kill 
probability the relationship appears to be 
approximately linear. For example, from Figure 
4 with n = 1 we see that a median number 2 for 
H (90% kill of the twenty possible warheads) 
can be achieved if p-y or p2 are cl°se to 0-08, 
whereas in the boost or reentry phases we 
would need p3 or p4 to be 0.56 to achieve this 
success. From Figure 5 with n = 10 we see that a 
median number 20 for H (90% kill of the two 
hundred possible warheads) can be achieved if 
Pl or p2 are close to 0.1, whereas in the boost or 
reentry phases we would need p$ or p^ to be 
0.65. Similarly, from Figure 5 we see that to 
QUANTIFYING COUNTERFORCE 
achieve a ninetieth percentile of 2 when n = 1 
requires either a p\ or p2 of about 0.28 or a p^ or 
p4 of 0.81; from Figure 5 a ninetieth percentile of 
20 when n = 10 requires either a p-y or pi of 
about 0.30 or a p3 or p4 of 0.79. 
Table 3 shows the expected numbers of 
weapons required at each stage and the expect- 
ed warhead kills per weapon when n = 10. By 
comparing the results with those in Table 2 it is 
clear that the required expected numbers of 
weapons at the counterforce, boost, or reentry 
phases do not change when warheads per mis- 
sile increase from 1 to 10, but the number of 
weapons in the final stage increases by a factor 
of ten. These results should be expected since a 
successful kill at any phase before the warheads 
separate is assumed to kill all n warheads. Note 
that, as n increases, the expected number of 
warheads killed per weapon increases signifi- 
cantly, the earlier one can attack the TBM oper- 
ation. In other words, counterforce is increas- 




(0, 0, 0, 0, 0.7)-Base Case 0 0 0 0 200 0.70 
(0, 0, 0, 0.2, 0.7) 0 0 0 20 160 0.84 
(0, 0, 0.2, 0, 0.7) 0 0 20 0 160 0.84 
(0, 0.2, 0, 0, 0.7) 0 4.94 0 0 49.4 3.41 
(0.2, 0, 0, 0, 0.7) 4.94 0 0 0 39.5 4.23 
Table 3: Expected Weapons Numbers and Effectiveness with Ten Warheads per Missile 
Kill Probability Vector 
Ten Warheads per Missile 
(n = 10) 
One Warhead per Missile 
(n = l) 
Median Normal Approximation 
Median Normal Approximation 
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0.7)-Base Case 59.3 60.0 5.4 6.0 
(0, 0, 0, 0.2, 0.7) 
or 
(0, 0, 0.2, 0, 0.7) 
47.6 48.0 4.2 4.8 
(0, 0.2, 0, 0, 0.7) 10.3 14.8 0.6 1.5 
(0.2, 0, 0, 0, 0.7) 7.1 11.9 0.2 1.2 
(0.2, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7) NA 2.3 NA 0.2 
Table 4: Normal Approximation for the Median 
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ingly effective as the number of warheads car- 
ried by the missile increases. 
Normal Approximations 
For given values of m, n, and a kill proba- 
bility vector, it is easy to calculate the expected 
value of H using Equations (1), (5), and (8); like- 
wise one can easily find the variance using 
Equations (1), (2), (5), (6), and (9). But to find 
percentiles such as the median or the ninetieth 
percentile requires the distribution function of 
H, a much more complex calculation using 
Equations (4), (7), and (10). These equations 
were used to find the curves in Figures 2,4,5, 7, 
and 8. Recall that H is not a simple sum of inde- 
pendent random variables, but results from a 
complex set of five random events, the first two 
of which have a truncated geometric distribu- 
tion, the next two a conditional binomial distri- 
bution, and the last is a random sum of these 
weighted binomials. Even so, one might suspect 
that its distribution is approximately normal for 
at least some range of the parameter values, in 
which case the percentiles can be estimated 
using only the mean and variance of H. We 
investigate the appropriateness of a normal 
approximation for the median and ninetieth 
percentiles of H in this section. 
Since the normal is a symmetric distribu- 
tion its mean and median are equal. Table 4 con- 
tains actual medians and normal approxima- 
tions for the base case and kill probability vec- 
tors, and an example that assumes positive kill 
probabilities in all five stages. The normal 
approximation seems to perform reasonably 
well for the ten warhead case when there are 
zero kill probabilities in the counterforce stages; 
it does less well in the single warhead case. 
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Figure 9: Cumulative Tail Distributions and Normal Approximations, n = 1 
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zero, the distribution of H is highly skewed and 
the normal approximation for the median is 
poor. The entries NA (not applicable) in the 
table indicate that the probability that H is zero 
is larger than 0.5 so that no median value exists. 
Figure 9 contains cumulative tail distri- 
butions (solid lines) and normal approxi- 
mations (dashed lines) for the kill probability 
vectors in Table 3 and one warhead per missile. 
For none of the examples is the normal approx- 
imation close to the actual distribution except in 
the extreme tails. It is particularly poor when 
there is a positive probability of kill by counter- 
force. 
Figure 10 contains cumulative tail distri- 
butions (solid lines) and normal approxi- 
mations (dashed lines) for the kill probability 
vectors in Table 3 and ten warheads per missile. 
When there is no counterforce the normal 
approximation is close to the actual distribution 
over the whole range, but again there are signif- 
icant differences when there is a positive proba- 
bility of kill by counterforce. 
As one might expect the approximation 
does quite well when H is a fixed (non-random) 
sum of binomial random variables. Since this 
number is considerably larger when multiple 
warheads are present it does significantly better 
in this case. With positive counterforce proba- 
bilities the truncated geometric distribution of 
the number of missiles launched leads to skew- 
ing of the distribution of H. In this case the nor- 
mal approximation shows significant error. 
It is not recommended that the normal 
approximation be used for the median (or 
equivalently that the median and mean be 
assumed to take on the same value). Nor is it 
recommended that it be used as an approxi- 
mation to the tail distribution unless multiple 














Figure 10: Cumulative Tail Distributions and Normal Approximations, n = 10 
Military Operations Research, Winter 1994 Page 47 
QUANTIFYING COUNTERFORCE 
only significant source of uncertainty is in the 
final stages of the TBM operation. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
The model in this report shows that both 
counterforce and active defense will form 
essential parts of any future successful system 
for theater ballistic missile defense. Without 
counterforce it will be relatively easy for the 
enemy to overwhelm a feasible active defense 
system. A system that can successfully destroy 
launchers and their crews will provide consid- 
erable leverage in reducing the numbers of 
active defense weapons required; this leverage 
increases dramatically as the number of war- 
heads on each missile increases. The model 
allows the calculation of percentiles of the num- 
bers of warheads destroyed rather than simple 
expected values. 
Past experience in finding and destroying 
launchers has demonstrated little success. As 
was discussed in Conner, Ehlers, and Marshall 
[1993], success will most likely require a far 
more structured approach than has been used. 
A model for such a structure is that used in anti- 
submarine warfare where great experience has 
been gained in the past fifty years at finding and 
destroying torpedo underwater missile launch- 
ers. It is expected that the successful counter- 
force against launchers on land will require 
efforts in cueing, search, detection, localization, 
classification and destruction. Current efforts 
can be thought of as attempting to skip from 
cueing (for example, flaming datum informa- 
tion after launch) to attack. Future reports will 
consider how one might best accomplish the in- 
between phases to produce successful counter- 
force against mobile missile launchers. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1
 It is understood that a launcher may employ a 
number of tactics on its way to or from the 
launch site, such as stopping in hide sites. The 
model summarizes the effects of these strate- 
gies in a single survival or kill probability. 
Modeling, Simulation and Gaming (MSG) of Warfare 
Entering Warfare Through the Game 
Emerging technologies allow the integration of 
live, virtual and constructive simulations to the 
point that the warfighter cannot tell if his opponent 
is real or simulated. How do we get to this station? 





For more information: 
obtaining this fully integrated environment? This 
short course will provide a forum for military, 
industry and academia to discuss these issues and 
technologies currently available to the analytical 
and training community. 
September 5-8,1995 
Atlanta, GA 
Georgia Tech Continuing Education 
$850 
Department of Continuing Education 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332-0385 
Phone: 404/894-2547 
Page 48 Military Operations Research, Winter 1994 
